You are here: / / SUPREME COURT DID NOT WEIGH THE CONFLICTING EXPERT TESTIMONY ABOUT WHETHER...
, ,

SUPREME COURT DID NOT WEIGH THE CONFLICTING EXPERT TESTIMONY ABOUT WHETHER PETITIONER SEX-OFFENDER SUFFERED FROM A MENTAL ABNORMALITY REQUIRING CONFINEMENT PURSUANT TO THE MENTAL HYGIENE LAW; MATTER SENT BACK FOR A NEW HEARING BEFORE A DIFFERENT JUDGE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court in this sex-offender Mental-Hygiene-Law proceeding, determined the court did not base its decision to discharge and release the petitioner on the expert evidence presented at the hearing. The matter was sent back for a new hearing before a different judge:

The State’s expert here diagnosed petitioner with ASPD [antisocial personality disorder] with narcissistic features and the condition of psychopathy, and the expert testified that those diagnoses, together with petitioner’s enduring hostility towards women, collectively constitute a mental abnormality within the meaning of Mental Hygiene Law § 10.03 (i). She acknowledged that the scientific community has been debating for decades whether psychopathy is a distinct condition from ASPD, but she opined that they were indeed separate conditions. Petitioner’s expert, on the other hand, diagnosed petitioner with ASPD but testified that petitioner had no other conditions in addition to that diagnosis that would render him a sex offender within the meaning of Mental Hygiene Law article 10. He further testified that psychopathy was simply an extreme variant of ASPD and should not be considered a condition separate from ASPD.

The court determined that a diagnosis of psychopathy or psychopathic features is still only a diagnosis of ASPD alone and thus, under Donald DD. (24 NY3d at 190), could not constitute an “other condition” to provide a basis for a finding of a mental abnormality. … [I] so holding, the court did not resolve the conflict between the experts regarding ASPD and psychopathy by weighing their testimony but rather made a determination that, generally speaking and without regard to petitioner’s specific case, a finding of ASPD and psychopathy can never provide a basis for a finding of mental abnormality. Contrary to the court’s apparent conclusion, “the Court of Appeals in Donald DD. did not state that diagnosis of ASPD with psychopathy is insufficient to support a finding of mental abnormality” … . When supported by expert testimony, a diagnosis of ASPD and psychopathy is legally sufficient to provide a basis for a finding of mental abnormality Inasmuch as there was conflicting expert opinion on the matter, the court should have weighed the testimony of the experts in rendering its determination whether petitioner suffers from a mental abnormality … . Matter of Application for Discharge of Doy S. v State of New York. 2021 NY Slip Op 04456, Fourth Dept 7-16-21

 

You might also like
THE “ALLEGEDLY INCAPACITATED PERSON” (AIP) WAS NOT PRESENT FOR THE MENTAL HYGIENE LAW GUARDIANSHIP HEARING; THE AIP’S ATTORNEY CANNOT CONSENT TO THE APPOINTMENT OF A GUARDIAN IF THE AIP IS NOT PRESENT; MATTER REMITTED (FOURTH DEPT).
FAILURE TO HOLD A HEARING TO DETERMINE DEFENDANT’S MENTAL CONDITION AFTER TWO PSYCHIATRISTS FOUND DEFENDANT SUFFERED FROM A DANGEROUS MENTAL CONDITION WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR; ALTHOUGH THE ERROR WAS NOT PRESERVED, THE APPEAL WAS CONSIDERED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (FOURTH DEPT).
PETITIONER DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO SEEK A STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT (SEQRA) REVIEW OF A ONE-DAY SQUIRREL-HUNTING FUND-RAISING EVENT (FOURTH DEPT).
Biogas Facility Which Is Located on a Farm and Which Produces Electricity from Manure Is Not Entitled to a Tax Exemption Pursuant to the Former Version of RPTL 483-a
DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT THAT HE HAD A HANDGUN SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED, HOWEVER THE HANDGUN WOULD HAVE BEEN DISCOVERED ABSENT THE STATEMENT AND WAS ADMISSIBLE, THE SUPPRESSION ERROR THEREFORE COULD NOT HAVE AFFECTED DEFENDANT’S DECISION TO PLEAD GUILTY.
City-Judge Pay Disparity Justified by Population of Cities
DEFENDANT WAS ACQUITTED OF MENACING AT THE FIRST TRIAL BUT THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE MENACING CHARGES WAS ALLOWED IN THE SECOND TRIAL; THE COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE PRECLUDED PRESENTATION OF THAT EVIDENCE IN THE SECOND TRIAL; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FOURTH DEPT). ​
FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE HELD A CUSTODY HEARING WITHOUT FATHER’S PARTICIPATION (FOURTH DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

FAMILY COURT’S FAILURE TO CONSIDER THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS OF THE... THE DEFENDANT’S STATEMENTS MADE TO A CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES CASEWORKER...