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MOTHER’S REFUSING TO SIGN MEDICAL CONSENT FORMS FOR PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT OF HER CHILD DID NOT CONSTITUTE NEGLECT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the Administration for Children’s Services (ACS) did not demonstrate mother had neglected the child by refusing to sign medical consent forms which resulted in the child being discharged from the psychiatric care at the Richmond University Medical Center (RUMC):

ACS failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the mother neglected the child. ACS did not establish that the mother’s failure to sign the admissions paperwork for the child’s stay at RUMC, or her failure to consent to the child being given a drug known as Risperdal, impaired, or caused imminent risk of impairment of, the child’s physical, mental, or emotional condition. Contrary to the allegation in the petition, the child’s medical records showed that she was discharged from RUMC because her condition had stabilized and she did not appear to be a threat to herself or others. Moreover, the mother agreed with the recommendation that the child receive follow-up outpatient care, and at the time that the child was discharged, the mother had two such appointments scheduled. As to the mother’s failure to consent to the child being given Risperdal, the medical records showed that, despite not being given this medication, the child’s condition stabilized during her hospitalization such that she was able to be released safely for outpatient treatment. ACS presented no evidence that outpatient treatment without the use of Risperdal was not “an acceptable course of treatment in light of all of the surrounding circumstances” … . Matter of Nabil H. A. (Vinda F.), 2021 NY Slip Op 04129, Second Dept 6-30-21

 

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