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DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO A DOWNWARD DEPARTURE (LEVEL TWO TO ONE) IN THIS CHILD PORNOGRAPHY CASE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion for a downward departure in this child pornography case should have been granted:

At a hearing pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (Correction Law art 6-C) to determine the defendant’s risk level, defense counsel requested that, despite the defendant’s score on the risk assessment instrument, which placed him at the lower end of the presumptive level two risk category, the Supreme Court should exercise its discretion to grant a downward departure and designate the defendant a level one sex offender … . …

Under the circumstances of this case—including, among other things, the small number of images found on the defendant’s cell phone and the absence of any evidence of child pornography on his laptop, the brief period of time during which the defendant is alleged to have collected child pornography, the defendant’s lack of criminal history, and a psychosexual evaluation report finding that the defendant’s risk of reoffense was low—we find that a preponderance of the evidence established that the risk assessment instrument overassessed the defendant’s risk of reoffense, and that his request for a downward departure should be granted in the exercise of discretion … . People v Sestito, 2021 NY Slip Op 03859, Second Dept 6-15-21

 

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