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WHERE THE ORDER DISMISSING A COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO CPLR 3215 AFTER A SEVEN-YEAR DELAY IN SEEKING A DEFAULT JUDGMENT DID NOT SPECIFICALLY SET FORTH CONDUCT DEMONSTRATING A GENERAL PATTERN OF DELAY THE SAVINGS CLAUSE OF CPLR 205 APPLIES AND THE ACTION MAY BE RE-COMMENCED WITHIN SIX MONTHS OF THE DISMISSAL (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the initial foreclosure action was not dismissed for failure to prosecute and, therefore, the savings provision of CPLR 205 applied. The court noted that the seven-year delay in seeking a default judgment which resulted in the dismissal did not constitute “neglect to prosecute:”

For purposes of the savings provision of CPLR 205 (a), “[w]here a dismissal is one for neglect to prosecute the action made pursuant to [CPLR 3216] or otherwise, the judge shall set forth on the record the specific conduct constituting the neglect, which conduct shall demonstrate a general pattern of delay in proceeding with the litigation” … . Here, the first action was dismissed as abandoned pursuant to CPLR 3215 (c). In making this determination, Supreme Court noted that plaintiff waited almost seven years before moving for a default after defendant failed to answer and that plaintiff failed to establish a reasonable excuse for the delay in seeking the default. Therefore … Supreme Court’s order dismissing the first action did not set forth on the record conduct that “demonstrate[d] a general pattern of delay” … . As such, under these circumstances, the second action does not fall outside the savings provision … . * * *

… [T]he Second Department recently ruled that the savings provision was still applicable to a subsequent action when the prior action was dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3215 (c) for failure to move for a judgment against a defendant for “almost seven years” because the trial court did not include findings of specific conduct demonstrating a general pattern of delay in proceeding with litigation … . U.S. Bank N.A. v Jalas, 2021 NY Slip Op 03506, Third Dept 6-3-21

 

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