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THE EXECUTIVE ORDERS SUSPENDING OR MODIFYING THE LAW IN RESPONSE TO COVID-19 TOLLED THE TIME-LIMIT FOR FILING AN APPEAL UNTIL WITHIN 30 DAYS OF NOVEMBER 2, 2020 (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the Executive Orders suspending or modifying laws to accommodate the disruption caused by COVID-19 tolled the time limitation for the taking of an appeal until within 30 days of November 2, 2020:

The respondents contend that even though Executive Order (A. Cuomo) No. 202.8 … purported to toll the limitations periods, Governor Cuomo did not have the statutory authority to do so, as Executive Law § 29-a, while expressly granting the Governor the authority to suspend statutes, does not expressly grant the Governor the authority to “toll” them. This contention is unpersuasive. … Executive Law § 29-a(2)(d) provides that an order issued pursuant thereto “may provide for the alteration or modification of the requirements of such statute, local law, ordinance, order, rule or regulation suspended, and may include other terms and conditions.” This language in Executive Law § 29-a(2)(d) indicates that the Governor is authorized to do more than just “suspend” statutes during a state disaster emergency; he or she may “alter[ ]” or “modif[y]” the requirements of a statute, and a tolling of time limitations contained in such statute is within that authority … .

Furthermore, although the seven executive orders issued after Executive Order (A. Cuomo) No. 202.8 … did not use the word “toll,” those executive orders all either stated that the Governor “hereby continue[s] the suspensions, and modifications of law, and any directives, not superseded by a subsequent directive,” made in the prior executive orders … or contained nearly identical language to that effect … . Since the tolling of a time limitation contained in a statute constitutes a modification of the requirements of such statute within the meaning of Executive Law § 29-a(2)(d), these subsequent executive orders continued the toll that was put in place by Executive Order (A. Cuomo) No. 202.8 (9 NYCRR 8.202.8). Brash v Richards, 2021 NY Slip Op 03436, Second Dept 6-2-21

 

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