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PURSUANT TO THE SURROGATE’S COURT PROCEDURE ACT (SCPA), AN ADMINISTRATOR MAY BE SUSPENDED WITHOUT A PETITION OR ISSUANCE OF PROCESS FOR MISAPPROPRIATING ESTATE PROPERTY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Surrogate’s Court, determined the motion to suspend the administrators of the estate should have been granted. The administrators had allowed the estate to languish for 20 years and there was evidence estate property had been misappropriated by one administrator:

Pursuant to SCPA 719, “the court may make a decree suspending . . . or revoking letters issued to a fiduciary from the court . . . without a petition or the issuance of process” where, among other things, “any of the facts provided in [SCPA] 711 are brought to the attention of the court” (SCPA 719[10] … . The circumstances set forth under SCPA 711 justifying “a decree suspending . . . or revoking those letters” include a fiduciary “having wasted or improperly applied the assets of the estate” … or having “removed property of the estate . . . without prior approval of the court” … . “The removal of a fiduciary pursuant to SCPA 711 and 719 is equivalent to ‘a judicial nullification of the testator’s choice and may only be decreed when the grounds set forth in the relevant statutes have been clearly established'” … . The grounds set forth under SCPA 711 may be clearly established “by undisputed facts or concessions, where the fiduciary’s in-court conduct causes such facts to be within the court’s knowledge, or where facts warranting amendment of letters are presented to the court during a related evidentiary proceeding” … . “Thus, revoking a fiduciary’s letters . . . pursuant to SCPA 719 will constitute an abuse of discretion ‘where the facts are disputed, where conflicting inferences may be drawn therefrom, . . . or where there are claimed mitigating facts that, if established, would render summary removal an inappropriate remedy'” … .

Here, the record contains undisputed evidence of conflict between the administrators, and evidence that the animosity between them has interfered with the expeditious administration of the decedent’s estate, which they have allowed to languish for nearly two decades … . Moreover, Menfus [one of the administrators] admitted … he executed a deed to one of the subject properties to himself, and permitted his father to live in the other property rent free. Matter of Steward, 2021 NY Slip Op 02395, Second Dept 4-21-21

 

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