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THE INSTANT FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS PRECLUDED BY A PRIOR FORECLOSURE ACTION WHICH HAD NOT BEEN DISCONTINUED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the instant foreclosure action was precluded by a prior action which had not been discontinued:

In May 2014, JPMorgan commenced an action to foreclose the consolidated mortgage (hereinafter the prior action). In August 2014, JPMorgan assigned the consolidated mortgage to Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC (hereinafter the plaintiff). In August 2016, the plaintiff commenced this action to foreclose the subject mortgage. …

RPAPL 1301(3) provides that “[w]hile [an] action is pending . . . , no other action shall be commenced or maintained to recover any part of the mortgage debt, without leave of the court in which the former action was brought.” “The object of the statute is to shield the mortgagor from the expense and annoyance of two independent actions at the same time with reference to the same debt” … . Here, since the plaintiff commenced the instant action without leave of the court in which the prior action was brought, and there is no basis in the record to determine that JPMorgan discontinued or effectively abandoned the prior action, dismissal is warranted under RPAPL 1301(3) … . Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v Starr-Klein, 2021 NY Slip Op 02269, Second Dept 4-14-21

 

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