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THE APPLICABLE INDUSTRIAL CODE PROVISION APPLIES TO MORE THAN JUST THE OBSTRUCTION OF PASSAGEWAYS; IT ALSO APPLIES TO BUILDING MATERIAL WHICH IS NOT PROPERLY STORED AND SECURED (AND FALLS); PLAINTIFF’S LABOR LAW 241 (6) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s Labor Law 241 (6) cause of action should not have been dismissed in this falling object case. Plaintiff was struck by a component of an unbuilt mail box which fell:

Plaintiff’s Labor Law § 241 (6) claim is predicated on 12 NYCRR 23-2.1 (a) (1), which provides in relevant part that “[a]ll building materials shall be stored in a safe and orderly manner. Material piles shall be stable under all conditions and so located that they do not obstruct any passageway, walkway, stairway or other thoroughfare” … . Contrary to defendants’ assertion, the scope of 12 NYCRR 23-2.1 (a) (1) is not limited exclusively to obstructed thoroughfares … . Rather, the plain text of the regulation creates three distinct obligations and potential sources of liability: first, “[a]ll building materials shall be stored in a safe and orderly manner”; second, “[m]aterial piles shall be stable under all conditions”; and third, “[m]aterial piles shall be . . . so located that they do not obstruct any passageway, walkway, stairway or other thoroughfare” … . …

… [W]e agree with plaintiff that the mailbox component at issue qualifies as a “building material[]” within the meaning of 12 NYCRR 23-2.1 (a) (1), and we further agree with plaintiff that triable issues of fact exist regarding the “safe[ty] and orderl[iness]” of the “manner” in which defendants “stored” that “building material[].” Slowe v Lecesse Constr. Servs., LLC, 2021 NY Slip Op 01887, Fourth Dept 3-26-21

 

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THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER A DEFENDANT WHICH DID NOT OWN THE AREA WHERE PLANTIFF SLIPPED AND FELL COULD BE LIABLE UNDER THE SPECIAL USE DOCTRINE (FOURTH DEPT).
PLAINTIFF COLLIDED WITH DEFENDANTS’ BLACK ANGUS BULL IN THE ROADWAY ON A DARK RAINY NIGHT, EVEN ASSUMING DEFENDANTS’ NEGLIGENCE PURSUANT TO THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR, PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE HER FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).
STATEMENT WHICH WAS NOT IN THE 710.30 NOTICE, AND WHICH PROVIDED EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT’S DOMINION AND CONTROL OF THE RESIDENCE WHERE DRUGS WERE FOUND, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE.
ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT MET THE CRITERIA FOR A PERSISTENT FELONY OFFENDER THE RESULTING SENTENCE WAS TOO HARSH; SENTENCE REDUCED BY THE APPELLATE DIVISION (FOURTH DEPT).
COUNTY COURT VIOLATED DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW BY FAILING TO NOTIFY DEFENDANT IT INTENDED TO ASSESS POINTS IN THE SORA RISK-LEVEL HEARING THAT WERE NOT RECOMMENDED BY THE BOARD OR PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE; NEW HEARING ORDERED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (FOURTH DEPT).
Defendant’s Temporary Possession of a Weapon Was “Innocent”
​ ALTHOUGH NOT REQUIRED UNDER THE GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW, FILING A NOTICE OF CLAIM FOR AN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION ACTION IS REQUIRED UNDER THE TOWN LAW; BECAUSE THE TOWN HAD TIMELY KNOWELDGE OF THE FACTS UNDERLYING THE ACTION, PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM (FOURTH DEPT).
VILLAGE EMPLOYEE’S TERMINATION BECAUSE HE DID NOT HAVE A COMMERCIAL DRIVER’S LICENSE WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS, JOB DESCRIPTION DID NOT EXPLICITLY REQUIRE A COMMERCIAL DRIVER’S LICENSE (FOURTH DEPT).

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