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EVEN THOUGH PLAINTIFF MAY HAVE ACCEPTED DEFECTIVE GOODS WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE UCC, THE UCC PROVIDES REMEDIES, INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO BE MADE WHOLE AND THE RIGHT TO REVOKE THE ACCEPTANCE; PLAINTIFF’S VERDICT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Christopher, reversing Supreme Court, determined the verdict should not have been set aside in this consumer law case. Plaintiff ordered kitchen cabinets. When they arrived one box was opened by defendant-seller’s representative to confirm the color. Plaintiff then signed a “Completion Certificate” which indicated the cabinets had been found satisfactory. In fact the cabinets were not satisfactory as revealed when they were installed. The Second Department noted that, although under the UCC plaintiff, based on the “Completion Certificate,” could not reject the goods, the UCC provides that she could be made whole, and, in fact, could revoke her acceptance, in addition to other available remedies. Therefore plaintiff’s verdict awarding $30,000 should not have been set aside:

“Acceptance of goods by the buyer precludes rejection of the goods accepted” (UCC 2-607[2]; see Comment 2). However, “acceptance does not of itself impair any other remedy provided by [article 2 of the UCC] for non-conformity” (UCC 2-607[2] …). “Thus, ‘acceptance leaves unimpaired the buyer’s right to be made whole, and that right can be exercised by the buyer not only by way of cross-claim for damages, but also by way of recoupment in diminution or extinction of the [purchase] price'” … . …

Moreover, after the buyer has accepted allegedly non-conforming goods, the buyer may revoke acceptance of the goods under certain limited circumstances and “obtain the same remedies as are available upon rejection” … . …

… [E]ven if the jury found that the plaintiff did not properly revoke her acceptance of the cabinets, the jury could have found that the plaintiff was entitled to other remedies pursuant to UCC 2-607 … .

… [T]he jury’s verdict that … the defendant breached their contract with the plaintiff, breached the implied warranty of fitness, and that the plaintiff was entitled to damages in the amount of $30,000 was supported by a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from the evidence at trial … . Campbell v Bradco Supply Co., 2021 NY Slip Op 01745, Second Dept 3-24-21

 

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