You are here: / / DEFENDANTS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO A DIRECTED VERDICT ON THE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION...
, , , ,

DEFENDANTS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO A DIRECTED VERDICT ON THE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CAUSE OF ACTION; DEFENSE COUNSEL’S REMARK ABOUT THE FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF A PLAINTIFF’S VERDICT DEPRIVED PLAINTIFF OF A FAIR TRIAL; THE COURT OF CLAIMS HAS EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER ACTIONS SEEKING MONEY DAMAGES FROM THE STATE, RELEVANT CAUSES OF ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, over a dissent, determined defendants’ motion for a directed verdict should not have been granted and the defense attorney’s remark in summation warranted a new trial. Plaintiff alleged he was denied promotion at the Central New York Psychiatric Center (CNYPC) because the defendants deemed him mentally unstable due to his status as a veteran of the Iraq war.  The directed verdict awarded defendants on that issue was reversed. The defense counsel’s remark in summation that one of the individual defendants would have to “open up her checkbook and write somebody a check” if plaintiff wins deprived plaintiff of a fair trial (the state is required to indemnify defendants as state officers and employees). This case was brought in Supreme Court. The Fourth Department noted that the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over actions against the state for money damages (apparently the relevant causes of action were properly dismissed for that reason):

Plaintiff … contends that the court erred in granting defendants’ motion for a directed verdict with respect to plaintiff’s cause of action under the New York Human Rights Law alleging discrimination based on military status … . We agree. * * * Based upon the … testimony that plaintiff was not promoted because “[t]here was a question after [plaintiff’s] military service about his [mental] stability,” the jury could have rationally inferred that defendants refused to promote plaintiff in part because they perceived that combat veterans, such as plaintiff, develop dangerous and disqualifying mental health issues as a result of their military service. Thus, “it cannot be said that ‘it would . . . be utterly irrational for a jury to reach [a verdict in favor of plaintiff]’ ” … . * * *

… [R]emarks about a party’s financial status “have been universally condemned by the courts of this State” … . The defense attorney’s argument that his clients should not be “forced to open [their] checkbook” likely conveyed that the individual defendants would be required to pay any damages out-of-pocket. That remark was “grossly improper” … . Moreover, it misrepresented the law to the jury. The State has a duty to indemnify its employees for judgments that arise out of actions within the scope of their public duties, although that duty does not arise from injury or damage resulting from intentional wrongdoing on the part of the employee (see Public Officers Law § 17 [3] [a]). Hubbard v New York State Off. of Mental Health, Cent. N.Y. Psychiatric Ctr., 2021 NY Slip Op 01661, Fourth Dept 3-19-21

 

You might also like
JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, DRAWN AN ADVERSE INFERENCE AGAINST FATHER BASED UPON FATHER’S FAILURE TO CALL HIS GIRLFRIEND AS A WITNESS WITHOUT FIRST INFORMING FATHER AND GIVING FATHER A CHANCE TO EXPLAIN, ERROR DEEMED HARMLESS HOWEVER (FOURTH DEPT).
Insufficient Foundation for Cross Examination About Witness’ Mental Health
RESIDENT PHYSICIANS DID NOT EXERCISE INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT AND WERE NOT REQUIRED TO INTERVENE IN THE TREATMENT BY THE ATTENDING PHYSICIAN, THE RESIDENTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).
DEFENDANT’S CONVICTIONS FOR PREDATORY SEXUAL ASSAULT AGAINST A CHILD AND RAPE AFFIRMED UNDER A WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ANALYSIS, THE DISSENT, APPLYING A WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ANALYSIS, ARGUED THE EVIDENCE DID NOT RISE TO THE LEVEL OF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT (FOURTH DEPT).
THE PEOPLE DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE ANONYMOUS TIP PROVIDED PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE DEFENDANT WAS IN THE VEHICLE PURSUED AND STOPPED BY THE POLICE (FOURTH DEPT).
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE PETITIONER’S REQUEST TO CONTINUE THE TRIAL WITH ELEVEN JURORS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; IN ADDITION IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO DECLARE A MISTRIAL ON ALL COUNTS WITHOUT INQUIRING WHETHER A VERDICT HAD BEEN REACHED ON ANY OF THE COUNTS; RETRIAL OF THIS MURDER CASE PROHIBITED ON DOUBLE JEOPARDY GROUNDS; WRIT OF PROHIBITION GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).
THE WARRANT AUTHORIZING THE SEARCH OF THE CONTENTS OF DEFENDANT’S CELL PHONE DID NOT RESTRICT THE SEARCH TO EVIDENCE OF ANY PARTICULAR CRIME AND DID NOT INCORPORATE THE POLICE INVESTIGATOR’S AFFIDAVIT WHICH PURPORTEDLY LAID OUT THE BASIS FOR FINDING PROBABLE CAUSE; THE WARRANT DID NOT MEET THE “PARTICULARITY REQUIREMENT” (FOURTH DEPT).
Question Posed by the Prosecutor to Prospective Black Jurors About Whether They Felt Police Officers Unfairly Target Members of the Minority Community Required Reversal

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

SENTENCE DEEMED UNDULY HARSH (FOURTH DEPT). THE ACKNOWLEDGED VIOLATION OF THE INDUSTRIAL CODE WAS MERELY “SOME EVIDENCE...