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THE DEFAULT LETTER, WHICH INDICATED THE MORTGAGE DEBT WOULD BE ACCELERATED AT A SPECIFIC FUTURE DATE IF THE DEFAULT WERE NOT CURED, DID NOT ACCELERATE THE DEBT; THEREFORE THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DID NOT START RUNNING AND THE FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS TIMELY (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the mortgage debt was not accelerated by a letter indicating the debt would be accelerated on a specific future date if the arears were not paid:

… [T]he issue is whether the May 2008 default letter was an acceleration event that triggered the statute of limitations. We hold that is was not. Thus, the second action, commenced in October 2014, was timely. To that end, the May 2008 letter provided that, if the default was not cured “on or before June 10, 2008, the mortgage payments will be accelerated with the full amount remaining accelerated and becoming due and payable in full, and foreclosure proceedings will be initiated at that time.” Since this letter was “‘merely an expression of future intent that fell short of an actual acceleration,’ which could ‘be changed in the interim'” … , it did not accelerate the debt … . “[T]he letter did not seek immediate payment of the entire, outstanding loan, but referred to acceleration only as a future event, indicating the debt was not accelerated at the time the letter was written” … . Further, the May 2008 letter specifically discussed other non-acceleration options for defendant, including a repayment plan or loan modification, which plaintiff, as the holder of the note, should be able to do “without running the risk of being deemed to have taken the drastic step of accelerating the loan” … . Thus, the statute of limitations was not triggered until the debt was accelerated by the commencement of the first action in February 2009 … , rendering the commencement of the second action, in October 2014, timely as it was within the six-year statute of limitations …  . GMAT Legal Tit. Trust 2014-1, Us Bank Natl. Assn. v Wood, 2021 NY Slip Op 01455, Third Dept 3-11-21

 

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