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ABSENT A REQUEST FROM A PARTY, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE SUMMARILY DISMISSED THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ASPECT OF THIS HYBRID ARTICLE 78/DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the court should not have summarily dismissed the declaratory judgment aspect of this hybrid declaratory judgment/Article 78 action. The Second Department found that Supreme Court had properly affirmed the denial of a special use permit for a dog kennel, but the Second Department reinstated the request for a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of a related local law:

… [T]he Supreme Court should not have summarily dismissed the cause of action for a judgment declaring that Town of Lewisboro Code § 220-23(D)(7) is unconstitutional. “In a hybrid proceeding and action, separate procedural rules apply to those causes of action which are asserted pursuant to CPLR article 78, on the one hand, and those to recover damages and for declaratory relief, on the other hand” … . “The Supreme Court may not employ the summary procedure applicable to a CPLR article 78 cause of action to dispose of causes of action to recover damages or seeking a declaratory judgment” … . “‘Thus, where no party makes a request for a summary determination of the causes of action which seek to recover damages or declaratory relief, it is error for the Supreme Court to summarily dispose of those causes of action'” … . Here, since no party made such a request, the court erred in summarily disposing of the cause of action for a judgment declaring that Town of Lewisboro Code § 220-23(D)(7) is unconstitutional. Matter of Muller v Zoning Bd. of Appeals Town of Lewisboro, 2021 NY Slip Op 01416, Second Dept 3-10-21

 

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