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THE ROBBERY COULD NOT BE COMMITTED WITHOUT COMMITTING THE ASSAULT; ASSAULT COUNT DISMISSED AS MULTIPLICITOUS; ISSUE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s assault first conviction, determined the robbery first and assault first counts were multiplicitous. The redundant count was dismissed in the interest of justice (error was not preserved):

“An indictment is multiplicitous when two separate counts charge the same crime” … . “Multiplicity does not exist where each count requires proof of an additional fact that the other does not” or where “a conviction on one count would not be inconsistent with acquittal on the other” … . “If an indictment is multiplicitous it creates the risk that a defendant will be punished for, or stigmatized with a conviction of, more crimes than he actually committed” … . Here, the record reflects that the jury charges regarding the count of assault in the first degree and the count of robbery in the first degree were essentially identical since one cannot commit robbery in the first degree under Penal Law § 160.15(1) without simultaneously committing assault in the first degree under Penal Law § 120.10(4) … . As such, those charges were multiplicitous … . Although the dismissal of the multiplicitous count will not affect the duration of the defendant’s sentence of imprisonment, it is nevertheless appropriate in this case to dismiss the count charging assault in the first degree in consideration of the stigma attached to the redundant convictions … . People v Edmondson, 2021 NY Slip Op 08201, Second Dept 2-24-21

 

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