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WHERE PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER IS A BUSINESS ENTITY, HERE BLOOMBERG L.P., AN OWNER OR OFFICER OF THE COMPANY, HERE MICHAEL BLOOMBERG, IS NOT AN EMPLOYER WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE NYC HUMAN RIGHTS LAW; THE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION ACTION AGAINST MICHAEL BLOOMBERG WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Garcia, over an extensive dissent, determined Michael Bloomberg, in his status as “owner” and officer of the company, Bloomberg L.P., is not an “employer” within the meaning of the NYC Human Rights Law, and therefore cannot be liable for harassment of the plaintiff (Doe) by her supervisor, Ferris. Bloomberg L.P. can be vicariously liable as the employer, but Michael Bloomberg cannot:

Plaintiff, an employee of Bloomberg L.P. using the pseudonym “Margaret Doe,” brought suit against defendants Bloomberg L.P., her supervisor Nicholas Ferris, and Michael Bloomberg, asserting several causes of action arising from alleged discrimination, sexual harassment, and sexual abuse. The question before us is whether Bloomberg, in addition to Bloomberg L.P., may be held vicariously liable as an employer under the New York City Human Rights Law (Administrative Code of City of NY, title 8 [City HRL]) based on his status as “owner” and officer of the company. We hold that Bloomberg is not an “employer” within the meaning of the City HRL and accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of plaintiff’s claims that seek to hold Bloomberg vicariously liable for Ferris’s offending conduct. * * *

The language in the City HRL … requires no external limiting principle exempting employees from individual suit as employers. … [W]here a plaintiff’s employer is a business entity, the shareholders, agents, limited partners, and employees of that entity are not employers within the meaning of the City HRL. … [T]hose individuals may incur liability only for their own discriminatory conduct, for aiding and abetting such conduct by others, or for retaliation against protected conduct (Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107 [1], [6], [7]). This rule [is] consistent with the principles of vicarious and limited liability governing certain business structures (see e.g. Partnership Law §§ 26, 121-303; Limited Liability Company Law § 609; Business Corporation Law § 719). Doe v Bloomberg, L.P., 2021 NY Slip Op 00898, CtApp, 2-11-21

 

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