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THE PEOPLE DID NOT OBTAIN PERMISSION TO PRESENT TO A SECOND GRAND JURY RENDERING THE SECOND INDICTMENT VOID (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing County Court, determined the indictment to which defendant plead guilty was void because the People did not obtain the court’s permission to present to a second grand jury after the first indictment was dismissed:

… [T]he People failed to seek leave pursuant to CPL 210.20 (4) to resubmit the matter to a second grand jury after County Court granted that part of defendant’s omnibus motion seeking to dismiss the original indictment as against him on the ground that the evidence before the first grand jury was legally insufficient. “[T]he failure to obtain leave of court to present a matter to a second grand jury, where required, deprives the grand jury of jurisdiction to hear the matter, thereby rendering the indictment void . . . , which, in turn, deprives the court of jurisdiction” … . Although, here, defendant failed to make a motion to dismiss the indictment issued by the second grand jury pursuant to CPL 210.20 (1), the failure of the People to obtain from the court authorization to submit the matter to the second grand jury deprived the second grand jury of jurisdiction to hear the matter, thereby rendering void the indictment issued by the second grand jury and depriving the court of jurisdiction, and the right to challenge a lack of jurisdiction cannot be waived by defendant … . Under these circumstances, we must dismiss the indictment issued by the second grand jury that is at issue on this appeal … . We note that there is no limit to the number of times that the People may resubmit a charge to a grand jury with leave pursuant to CPL 210.20 (4) … . People v Owens, 2021 NY Slip Op 00958, Fourth Dept 2-11-21

 

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