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RATHER THAN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT, SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE ORDERED THE NECESSARY PARTIES SUMMONED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the motion to dismiss should not have been granted on the ground plaintiffs failed to join necessary parties. The court should have ordered the parties summoned:

Necessary parties are those “who ought to be parties if complete relief is to be accorded between the persons who are parties to the action or who might be inequitably affected by a judgment in the action” (CPLR 1001[a] …). Here, the Supreme Court correctly determined that the Limited Partnership and the third limited partner, Ai Ying Zheng, are necessary parties to this action … . …

… [A]s the Limited Partnership and Ai Ying Zheng are subject to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the court should have “order[ed][them] summoned,” rather than granting the motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to join necessary parties (CPLR 1001[b]…). Ji Juan Lin v Bo Jin Zhu, 2021 NY Slip Op 00550, Second Dept 2-3-21

 

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