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PLAINTIFF, A PROBATIONARY EMPLOYEE, WAS TERMINATED FOR MARIJUANA USE; QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER AN ACCOMMODATION FOR PLAINTIFF AS A MEDICAL MARIJUANA PATIENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined there are questions of fact about whether plaintiff probationary employee was entitled to accommodation under the Human Rights Law (HRL). She was terminated for marijuana use. However, the marijuana use was a treatment for an illness, irritable bowel disease (IBD):

… [T]here are issues of fact, for purposes of plaintiff’s claim for failure to accommodate under the State Human Rights Law (HRL), as to whether defendant adequately engaged in a cooperative dialogue with plaintiff …. to determine whether it could reasonably accommodate her status as a medical marijuana patient (see PHL 3369[2]). Notably, questions of fact exist as to whether defendant improperly cut the dialogue process short when it discovered that plaintiff was a probationary employee, and refused to consider accommodating her — as it regularly did for permanent employees — by, for example, giving her discipline short of termination, or simply overlooking the one-time technical violation in light of her contemporaneously acquired status as a medical marijuana patient … . …

The State HRL defines status as a medical marijuana patient as a protected disability, but the City HRL does not. Although the City HRL must be construed liberally to ensure maximum protection … , certification as a medical marijuana patient is (other than as specified for purposes of claims under the State HRL) a legal classification. It is not a “physical, medical, mental, or psychological impairment,” which is how disabilities are defined under the City HRL (Administrative Code § 8-102).

Nevertheless, plaintiff’s IBD, is a physical impairment and thus a disability under the City HRL. Accordingly, issues of fact exist as to whether defendant should have permitted plaintiff to treat her IBD through the medical use of marijuana, as a reasonable accommodation. Gordon v Consolidated Edison Inc.,2021 NY Slip Op 00492, First Dept 1-28-21

 

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