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THE CPLR 3215 REQUIREMENT THAT PROCEEDINGS TO TAKE A DEFAULT JUDGMENT BE COMMENCED WITHIN ONE YEAR OF THE DEFAULT APPLIES TO COUNTERCLAIMS; COUNTERCLAIM DISMISSED AS ABANDONED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department noted that the CPLR 3215 requirement that proceedings to take a default judgment be taken within one year of the default applies to a counterclaim and held that the counterclaim here must therefore be dismissed as abandoned:

CPLR 3215(c) provides that if the plaintiff fails to take proceedings for the entry of judgment within one year after the default, the court shall not enter judgment but shall dismiss the complaint as abandoned, upon its own initiative or on motion, unless sufficient cause is shown why the complaint should not be dismissed. While counterclaims are not specifically mentioned in CPLR 3215, the statute applies to claims asserted as counterclaims in addition to those set forth in complaints … . “The language of CPLR 3215(c) is not, in the first instance, discretionary, but mandatory, inasmuch as courts ‘shall’ dismiss claims (CPLR 3215[c]) for which default judgments are not sought within the requisite one-year period, as those claims are then deemed abandoned” … . “The failure to timely seek a default may be excused if ‘sufficient cause is shown why the complaint should not be dismissed’ (CPLR 3215[c]), which requires the party to proffer a reasonable excuse for the delay in timely moving for a default judgment and to demonstrate that the cause of action is potentially meritorious” … . …

Where, as here, a party moving for a default judgment beyond one year from the date of default fails to address any reasonable excuse for its untimeliness, courts may not excuse the lateness and “shall” dismiss the claim pursuant to CPLR 3215(c) … . Bazile v Saleh, 2021 NY Slip Op 00286, Second Dept 1-20-21

 

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