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THE ONE-YEAR PERIOD FOR TAKING A JUDGMENT RUNS FROM THE DEFAULT AFTER THE FILING AND SERVING OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT, NOT A SUBSEQUENT AMENDED COMPLAINT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the one-year period for taking a judgment after a default runs from the default after the filing and serving of the original complaint, not the amended complaint:

The mortgage foreclosure action should have been dismissed as against original borrower Melissa Eaton, pursuant to CPLR 3215(c), because plaintiff failed to “take proceedings for the entry of judgment” within one year of Eaton’s default. The time to seek a default judgment should be measured from the default in responding to the original, not the amended, complaint … . Although an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, and therefore requires a new responsive pleading to avoid default … , allowing the filing of an amended complaint to effectively cure a failure to timely move for a default in responding to the original complaint would create an exception that swallows the rule. Because plaintiff did not move for a default judgment until well after one year after Eaton’s default in responding to the original complaint, and because plaintiff fails to offer any excuse for this delay … , dismissal was appropriate under CPLR 3215(c) — notwithstanding plaintiff’s inability to bring a new action due to expiration of the statute of limitations … . MTGLQ Invs., L.P. v Shay, 2021 NY Slip Op 00237, First Dept 1-14-21

 

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