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AN INFORMAL JUDICIAL ADMISSTION BY PLAINTIFF BANK’S FORMER COUNSEL IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE LOAN HAD BEEN MODIFIED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the bank’s motion for summary judgment in this foreclosure action should not have been granted because of an informal judicial admission made by plaintiff’s former counsel. The admission raised a question of fact whether the note and mortgage had been superseded by a loan modification:

… [T]he averment of the plaintiff’s former counsel, in support of the voluntary discontinuance of the prior foreclosure action, that the loan had been modified, constituted an informal judicial admission by the plaintiff of that fact … . Informal judicial admissions are not conclusive, but are evidence of the fact admitted … .

On its motion, the plaintiff failed to proffer any evidence to explain the alleged error of its former counsel in a manner which would negate the probative value of his statement as an informal judicial admission. Accordingly, even assuming that the plaintiff’s submissions were otherwise sufficient to demonstrate, prima facie, the absence of a loan modification (see generally CPLR 4518[a] …) the former counsel’s admission raised a triable issue of fact as to the existence of a loan modification, which precluded summary judgment … . HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Fortini, 2020 NY Slip Op 07873, Second Dept 12-23-20

 

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