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QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE DEFENDANT’S DOUBLE-PARKED CAR WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT; PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT, A BICYCLIST, WAS STRUCK BY A TRUCK WHEN HE ATTEMPTED TO GO AROUND DEFENDANT’S DOUBLE-PARKED CAR (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department determined there were questions of fact about defendant driver’s (Sung’s) negligence and whether the negligence proximately cause plaintiff bicyclist’s injuries and death. Defendant was stopped in the right lane and when plaintiff attempted to go around defendant’s car he was struck by a truck (driven by Cruz-Marte). The First Department noted that hearsay was properly considered in opposition to the summary judgment motion:

Issues of fact exist with respect to whether Wenhua Sung negligently obstructed traffic with his vehicle based on his own testimony, in which he admitted that he was issued a ticket for obstructing a lane of traffic … , as well as that of Cruz-Marte, who testified that a vehicle was “double-parked,” although he was not sure what that vehicle looked like.

This evidence was sufficient to raise issues of fact regarding Sung’s negligence, even absent proof of Sung’s purported contemporaneous admissions to police that he was double-parked. Those admissions may also, however, be properly considered. Even if they are hearsay, they were offered in opposition to a motion for summary judgment and were not the only evidence submitted … .

Issues of fact also exist with respect to whether the Sung defendants’ negligence proximately caused the accident, as a jury could reasonably find that a bicyclist swerving and being hit by a passing vehicle was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of double-parking or obstructing a lane of traffic … . Dong v Cruz-Marte, 2020 NY Slip Op 07699, First Dept 12-22-20

 

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