You are here: / / QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE DEFENDANT’S DOUBLE-PARKED CAR WAS A...
,

QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE DEFENDANT’S DOUBLE-PARKED CAR WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT; PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT, A BICYCLIST, WAS STRUCK BY A TRUCK WHEN HE ATTEMPTED TO GO AROUND DEFENDANT’S DOUBLE-PARKED CAR (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department determined there were questions of fact about defendant driver’s (Sung’s) negligence and whether the negligence proximately cause plaintiff bicyclist’s injuries and death. Defendant was stopped in the right lane and when plaintiff attempted to go around defendant’s car he was struck by a truck (driven by Cruz-Marte). The First Department noted that hearsay was properly considered in opposition to the summary judgment motion:

Issues of fact exist with respect to whether Wenhua Sung negligently obstructed traffic with his vehicle based on his own testimony, in which he admitted that he was issued a ticket for obstructing a lane of traffic … , as well as that of Cruz-Marte, who testified that a vehicle was “double-parked,” although he was not sure what that vehicle looked like.

This evidence was sufficient to raise issues of fact regarding Sung’s negligence, even absent proof of Sung’s purported contemporaneous admissions to police that he was double-parked. Those admissions may also, however, be properly considered. Even if they are hearsay, they were offered in opposition to a motion for summary judgment and were not the only evidence submitted … .

Issues of fact also exist with respect to whether the Sung defendants’ negligence proximately caused the accident, as a jury could reasonably find that a bicyclist swerving and being hit by a passing vehicle was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of double-parking or obstructing a lane of traffic … . Dong v Cruz-Marte, 2020 NY Slip Op 07699, First Dept 12-22-20

 

You might also like
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL THE DEFENDANT ESTATE TO HIRE AN ATTORNEY OR BE DEEMED IN DEFAULT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; WHERE THERE ARE CLAIMS AGAINST AN ESTATE, THE ESTATE CANNOT REPRESENT ITSELF (FIRST DEPT).
DEFENDANT POLICE OFFICER WAS ENGAGED IN AN “EMERGENCY OPERATION” WITHIN THE MEANING OF VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW 1104 WHEN HIS POLICE VAN STRUCK PLAINTIFF AS SHE STEPPED INTO THE ROAD FROM BETWEEN PARKED CARS; DEFENDANT DID NOT ACT WITH RECKLESS DISREGARD FOR THE SAFETY OF OTHERS AND, THEREFORE, COULD NOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR PLAINTIFF’S INJURIES (FIRST DEPT).
FIXING A LEAKY ROOF NOT ROUTINE MAINTENANCE, PLAINTIFF’S LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION PROPERLY SURVIVED MOTION TO DISMISS.
THE RECORD-KEEPING AND INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS FOR NYC PAWNBROKERS DO NOT VIOLATE THE UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE PROHIBITION IN THE NYS CONSTITUTION.
PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE FRAUD CAUSE OF ACTION WOULD SUCCEED ON ITS MERITS, WARRANT OF ATTACHMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED 1ST DEPT.
CAUSES OF ACTION FOR BOTH CONSTRUCTIVE AND ACTUAL FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE STATED, ELEMENTS DESCRIBED.
Property Owner Responsible for Defect in Sidewalk that Did Not Directly “Abut” Owner’s Property (Liability Based On New York City Ordinance)
DEFENDANT’S REPEATED REQUESTS TO REPRESENT HIMSELF WERE NOT ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED BY THE THREE JUDGES TO WHOM THE REQUESTS WERE MADE; CONVICTION REVERSED AND NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FIRST DEPT). ​

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

DESPITE THE HORRIFIC NATURE OF THE CRIME, DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE WAS REDUCED... HEARSAY INSUFFICIENT TO DEFEAT PLAINTIFF’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION IN...