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EVEN THOUGH THE DEFENDANT ARGUED HE NEVER HAD ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION OF THE WEAPON FOUND IN ANOTHER’S HOUSE, DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO THE “INVOLUNTARY POSSESSION” JURY INSTRUCTION; POSSESSION, EITHER ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE, IS NOT VOLUNTARY IF IT IS FOR SO BRIEF A PERIOD OF TIME THAT THE DEFENDANT COULD NOT HAVE TERMINATED POSSESSION (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, over a three-judge dissent, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined there was a reasonable view of the evidence which supported a jury instruction on voluntary (involuntary) possession of a weapon. In addition to actual and constructive possession, there is the concept of involuntary possession. Both actual and constructive possession can be involuntary if it is so fleeting that the defendant was not able to terminate possession. Defendant argued he was a guest for the night in the house where the weapon was found and did not possess it all, either actually or constructively. The Court of Appeals noted that “involuntary possession” conflicted with “no possession at all,” but the jury still should have been instructed on involuntary possession because there was evidence to support the instruction:

The distinction among constructive, knowing, and voluntary possession that defendant emphasizes is reflected in the Criminal Jury Instructions’ model charge on voluntary possession, which provides that “[p]ossession . . . is voluntary when the possessor was aware of [their] physical possession or control . . . for a sufficient period to have been able to terminate the possession” (CJI2d [NY] Voluntary Possession § 15.00 [2] … . * * *

… [T]he trial court denied the charge here, not because the requested charge lacked evidentiary support, but because the court considered the proposed language more confusing than helpful. … . This determination was in error because the requested charge did not inject confusion into the instructions. Rather, it addressed an entirely different aspect of the charged possessory crime: the temporal requirement of voluntary possession. Indeed, the requested charge would have clarified the law because the charge, as erroneously given, allowed the jury to conclude that if defendant had control over the area where the gun was found—i.e., the bedroom—then he had constructive possession of the gun, regardless of how long he was actually aware of its presence. This is not an accurate statement of the relevant law where, as here, there is a reasonable view of the evidence that the possession may not have been voluntary. People v J.L., 2020 NY Slip Op 07663, CtApp 12-17-20

 

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