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DEFENDANTS MOVED TO DISQUALIFY PLAINTIFF, AN ATTORNEY AND PHYSICIAN REPRESENTING HIMSELF IN THIS FRAUD AND BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION, ARGUING PLAINTIFF MAY BE CALLED AS A WITNESS; THE DEFENDANTS DID NOT SPECIFY HOW PLAINTIFF’S TESTIMONY WOULD BE NECESSARY TO THE DEFENSE; THE MOTION TO DISQUALIFY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants’ motion to disqualify plaintiff Colantonio, an attorney and physician representing himself, should not have been granted. Plaintiffs brought a fraud an breach of contract action arising from the lease/purchase of a liposuction laser unit. Defendants moved to disqualify arguing Colantonio may be called as a witness:

“In order to disqualify counsel on the ground that he or she may be called as a witness, the party moving for disqualification has the burden of demonstrating that ‘(1) the testimony of the opposing party’s counsel is necessary to his or her case, and (2) such testimony would be prejudicial to the opposing party'” … . In turn, “[a] finding of necessity takes into account such factors as the significance of the matters, weight of the testimony, and availability of other evidence” … .

… [T]he defendants each failed to make the requisite showing that Colantonio should be disqualified as counsel for Empire Medical and Cestari. The defendants failed to specify the facts about which they expect Colantonio to testify or to establish how such testimony would be necessary to their defense … . They also failed to allege that Colantonio’s testimony would be prejudicial to plaintiffs Cestari or Empire Medical … . Indeed, Colantonio and Cestari both attested to the opposite. At this early stage in the litigation, discovery has not established the substance and necessity of Colantonio’s testimony in the action … . Moreover, in opposition to the motions, plaintiff Cestari averred that disqualification of Colantonio would cause a substantial hardship on him, which constitutes an exception to the rule 3.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct (22 NYCRR 1200.0) advocate-witness disqualification … . Empire Med. Servs. of Long Is., P.C. v Sharma, 2020 NY Slip Op 07545, Second Dept 12-16-20

 

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