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STATUTORY CRITERIA FOR CRIMINAL CONTEMPT FIRST DEGREE NOT MET; CONVICTION REDUCED TO CRIMINAL CONTEMPT SECOND DEGREE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the statutory criteria for criminal contempt first degree were not met and reduced the conviction to criminal contempt second degree:

As the People concede, the evidence was legally insufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt of criminal contempt in the first degree in violation of Penal Law § 215.51(c). An essential element of that crime is that the defendant has violated an order of protection issued pursuant to “sections two hundred forty and two hundred fifty-two of the domestic relations law, articles four, five, six and eight of the family court act and section 530.12 of the criminal procedure law, or an order of protection issued by a court of competent jurisdiction in another state, territorial or tribal jurisdiction, which requires the respondent or defendant to stay away from the person or persons on whose behalf the order was issued” … . Here, the defendant was accused of violating an order of protection issued pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law § 530.13. Criminal Procedure Law § 530.13, which provides protection to victims of crimes other than family offenses, is not one of the authorities enumerated in Penal Law § 215.51(c). Accordingly, the defendant’s conviction of criminal contempt in the first degree was legally insufficient because the People could not prove an essential element of the offense … . However, because the evidence was legally sufficient to support a conviction of the lesser included offense of criminal contempt in the second degree (see Penal Law § 215.50[3]), the defendant’s conviction is reduced accordingly … . People v Smith, 2020 NY Slip Op 07229, Second Dept 12-2-20

 

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