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NONPARTY BANK SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AWARDED POSSESSION OF A CAR SUBJECT TO CIVIL FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS. (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the nonparty banks should not have been awarded possession of cars subject to civil forfeiture proceedings brought by plaintiff:

The plaintiff commenced this civil forfeiture action pursuant to chapter 420, article II of the Code of Suffolk County, seeking forfeiture of a vehicle owned by the defendant Mary A. Nolie, and operated by an individual who was under the influence of an illegal substance. Thereafter, nonparty Santander Consumer USA, Inc. (hereinafter Santander), which held a lien on the vehicle, moved for summary judgment declaring that it was entitled to take possession of the vehicle, free and clear of any claims, and the plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment awarding civil forfeiture of the vehicle. … In a judgment … , the court directed that the vehicle be released to Santander, upon demand, free and clear of any claims. …

Contrary to Santander’s contention, it was not named in this action as a noncriminal defendant against whom the County sought to “recover” seized property … . Thus, the plaintiff was not required to establish that Santander “engaged in affirmative acts which aided, abetted or facilitated the conduct of [a] criminal defendant” in order to obtain forfeiture of the subject property … . Further, an innocent lienholder is not entitled to immediate possession of a vehicle which is the subject of a civil forfeiture action, but rather is merely entitled to “satisfy its lien from the proceeds of the property after the forfeiture ha[s] been adjudicated against the guilty party” and to seek any deficiency from the debtor … . Thus, Santander failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, and the Supreme Court should have denied its motion for summary judgment declaring that it is entitled to take possession of the vehicle, free and clear of any claims. Brown v A 2014 Honda, Vin No. 5J6RM4H74EL039078, 2020 NY Slip Op 07024, Second Dept 11-25-20

Similar issues and result in Brown v A 2007 Chevrolet, Vin No. 1GNET13M372223303, 2020 NY Slip Op 07023, Second Dept 11-25-20

 

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