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DEFENDANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SENTENCED AS A SECOND FELONY OFFENDER RE TWO COUNTS OF CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF A WEAPON THIRD DEGREE, WHICH ARE NOT VIOLENT FELONIES (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined the sentences for two counts of criminal possession of a weapon third degree, D felonies, were illegal:

… [T]he determinate terms of incarceration of seven years imposed on counts 2 and 10 of the indictment, for criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, class D felonies, are illegal. Those crimes are not violent felonies (see generally Penal Law § 70.02 [1] [c]), and therefore, the court should have sentenced defendant as a second felony offender on those counts and imposed indeterminate terms of incarceration (see § 70.06 [3] [d]; [4] [b]). Furthermore, inasmuch as defendant must be sentenced to indeterminate terms of incarceration, he is not subject to a period of postrelease supervision on those counts (see § 70.45 [1 …). People v Lovette, 2020 NY Slip Op 06892, Fourth Dept 11-20-20

 

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THE PEOPLE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE OF A PRIOR UNCHARGED... THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO CROSS EXAMINE THE DEFENSE EXPERT...