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DEFENDANT CLAIMED IN HIS DEPOSITION HE COULDN’T STOP AT THE RED LIGHT BECAUSE THE FLOOR MAT HAD ROLLED UP UNDER THE BRAKE PEDAL; PLAINTIFF SUBMITTED THE DEPOSITION AS PART OF PLAINTIFF’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION; THE MAJORITY HELD THE DEPOSITION WAS HEARSAY AND THEREFORE COULD NOT DEFEAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT; TWO DISSENTERS ARGUED THE USUAL HEARSAY RULES DID NOT APPLY BECAUSE THE DEPOSITION WAS SUBMITTED BY PLAINTIFF (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in this intersection traffic accident was properly granted. The defendant, in his deposition, claimed he was unable to stop at the red light because the floor mat had rolled up under the brake pedal. The plaintiff submitted defendant’s deposition testimony as part of plaintiff’s summary judgment motion. The majority considered defendant’s testimony hearsay and therefore insufficient to defeat summary judgment. The dissenters argued the hearsay rule did not apply because plaintiff submitted the deposition and thereby raised triable issues of fact, or, in the alternative, waived any objection to the hearsay:

Plaintiff met his initial burden on the motion of establishing as a matter of law that defendant was negligent in his operation of the vehicle inasmuch as defendant failed to stop at a red light … . Contrary to defendant’s contention, he failed to raise an issue of fact whether the emergency doctrine applies here … . The emergency doctrine provides that, “when [a driver] is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration, or causes the [driver] to be reasonably so disturbed that [he or she] must make a speedy decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, the [driver] may not be negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context” … . However, “[t]he emergency doctrine is only applicable when a party is confronted by [a] sudden, unforeseeable occurrence not of their own making” … . Stated differently, “it is settled law that the emergency doctrine has no application where . . . the party seeking to invoke it has created or contributed to the emergency” … . Further, although hearsay evidence may be considered in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, it is not by itself sufficient to defeat such a motion … . Here, defendant testified at his deposition that, at the time of the accident, he was not sure why he could not apply his brakes. He learned after the accident from a body shop mechanic that “[t]he floor pad was rolled up underneath the brake pedal.” He also testified that the floor mat sliding underneath his brakes was “the only reason [he could] think of” for his inability to brake. In view of that deposition testimony, we conclude that defendant’s reliance on the emergency doctrine was based solely on hearsay and speculation and thus did not raise a triable issue of fact whether that doctrine applies. The record includes no affidavit or deposition testimony from defendant’s mechanic. Watson v Peschel, 2020 NY Slip Op 06880, Fourth Dept 11-20-20

 

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