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PLAINTIFF’S KNEE BECAME STIFF AND IMPOSSIBLE TO BEND AFTER SURGERY; PLAINTIFF SUED THE DEFENDANT DOCTOR WHO TREATED HER AT THE POST-SURGERY REHABILITATION CENTER; THE DEFENDANT DOCTOR, WHO DID NOT PERFORM THE SURGERY, HAD CERTIFIED AND RECOMMENDED PHYSICAL AND OCCUPATIONAL THERAPY FOR PLAINTIFF AT THE REHABILITATION CENTER; BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT DOCTOR PLAYED NO ROLE IN THE THERAPY ITSELF, HIS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant doctor’s (Raber’s) motion for summary judgment should have been granted. Dr. Raber treated plaintiff at a nursing and rehabilitation center, Glen Cove, where, after knee surgery, plaintiff voluntarily transferred. After about a month at Glen Cove, plaintiff was seen by her orthopedic surgeon who found plaintiff’s knee had become stiff and impossible to bend. Dr. Raber had certified and recommended physical and occupational therapy at Glen Cove, for which Dr. Raber was not responsible. Dr. Raber moved for summary judgment on the ground that any regimen of physical therapy was the responsibility of Glen Cove:

“Although physicians owe a general duty of care to their patients, that duty may be limited to those medical functions undertaken by the physician and relied on by the patient” … .

Here, Raber testified at his deposition that he is trained only in internal medicine, and was the plaintiff’s internist while she was at Glen Cove. Raber established that he was not the plaintiff’s physical or occupational therapist and was not involved in the plaintiff’s physical therapy plan of care. Physical therapists (see Education Law §§ 6731, 6732) must be educated and licensed in that specific field (see Education Law § 6734), and Raber had no such training. Occupational therapists must similarly be educated and licensed in their field (see Education Law § 7904). Raber’s medical expert opined that Raber’s training as an internal medicine specialist did not encompass the skills and knowledge required to assess a patient’s physical therapy needs, create a physical therapy plan of care, or supervise a physical therapy plan of care. …

Raber established that he did not depart from good and accepted medical practice by deferring to the physical and occupational therapy specialists at Glen Cove for the assessment and treatment of the plaintiff’s right knee, and had no duty to evaluate the efficacy of that treatment, since he was not involved in that aspect of the plaintiff’s care … . Aaron v Raber, 2020 NY Slip Op 06738, Second Dept 11-18-20

 

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