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PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL AND AGENCY ALLEGATIONS SUFFICIENTLY PLED VICARIOUS LIABILTY FOR NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE NURSING HOME DEFENDANTS FOR AN ASSAULT BY A RESIDENT ON PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT; THE COMPLAINT ALSO SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGED PUBLIC HEALTH LAW VIOLATIONS; PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO SERVE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the complaint adequately stated negligence and Public Health Law causes of action against a nursing home facility stemming from an assault on plaintiff’s decedent by another resident. The Fourth Department found the complaint adequately alleged the criteria for piercing the corporate veil, the criteria for an agency relationship among the defendants, and for a Public Health Law cause of action. The court further found plaintiff’s motion to serve an amended complaint should have been granted:

… Plaintiff alleges that the … defendants were operated in such a way “as if they were one by commingling them on an interchangeable basis or convoluted separate properties, records or control.” Significantly, plaintiff alleged that the corporate formalities were conduits to avoid obligations to the facility’s residents, and thus the allegations are sufficient to state a cause of action for negligence under a theory of piercing the corporate veil or alter ego … . …

… [P]laintiff’s claims in the negligence cause of action that defendants are vicariously liable under theories of agency and joint venture are … sufficiently stated. “The elements of a joint venture are an agreement of the parties manifesting their intent to associate as joint venturers, mutual contributions to the joint undertaking, some degree of joint control over the enterprise, and a mechanism for the sharing of profits and losses” … . “Agency . . . is a fiduciary relationship which results from the manifestation of consent of one person to allow another to act on his or her behalf and subject to his or her control, and consent by the other so to act” … . Plaintiff alleges in the first amended complaint that defendants acted as agents for one another and, as relevant here, that they ratified the acts of one another regarding, inter alia, operation of the facility, allocation of resources, and mismanagement of the facility. …

Plaintiff alleged that in addition to residential care, the facility provided “health-related services,” including specialized dementia care, dietary supervision, hygiene and on-site medical and psychological care. Accepting those facts as alleged in the first amended complaint as true, and affording every possible favorable inference to plaintiff, we conclude plaintiff sufficiently alleged facts to overcome defendants’ argument that the facility is an assisted living facility and not subject to those sections of the Public Health Law … . Cunningham v Mary Agnes Manor Mgt., L.L.C., 2020 NY Slip Op 06582, Fourth Dept 11-13-20

 

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