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PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO EXTEND THE TIME TO SERVE THE DEFENDANT PURSUANT TO CPLR 306-B SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE; IF A PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO EXTEND TIME FOR GOOD CAUSE, THE COURT SHOULD GO ON TO CONSIDER WHETHER THE MOTION SHOULD BE GRANTED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion to extend the time to serve defendant should have been granted in the interest of justice. The court described the difference between the “good cause” and “interest of justice” analyses and indicated that if a court finds relief is not warranted for good cause, the interest of justice analysis should then be considered:

Pursuant to CPLR 306-b, a court may, in the exercise of discretion, grant a motion for an extension of time within which to effect service of the summons and complaint for good cause shown or in the interest of justice … . “‘Good cause’ and ‘interest of justice’ are two separate and independent statutory standards” … . “To establish good cause, a plaintiff must demonstrate reasonable diligence in attempting service” … . If good cause for an extension is not established, the court must consider the broader interest of justice standard of CPLR 306-b … . In considering the interest of justice standard, ‘the court may consider diligence, or lack thereof, along with any other relevant factor in making its determination, including expiration of the Statutes of Limitations, the meritorious nature of the cause of action, the length of delay in service, the promptness of a plaintiff’s request for the extension of time, and prejudice to defendant'” … .

Although the plaintiff failed to establish good cause for an extension of time to serve the defendant under CPLR 306-b, it established that an extension of time to serve the defendant was warranted in the interest of justice. The plaintiff established, among other things, that it has a potentially meritorious cause of action, that it promptly moved for an extension of time to serve the summons and complaint after the defendant challenged service on the ground that it was defective, and that there was no demonstrable prejudice to the defendant as a consequence of the delay in service … . Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Ciafone, 2020 NY Slip Op 06580, Second Dept 11-12-20

 

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