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CYNTHIA G SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN INVOLUNTARILY CONFINED BASED UPON A FINDING SHE WAS MENTALLY ILL IN THE ABSENCE OF A HEARING; THE FINDING WAS MADE BASED SOLELY UPON CYNTHIA G’S BEHAVIOR IN THE COURTROOM; ALTHOUGH CYNTHIA G HAS BEEN RELEASED THE APPEAL WAS HEARD AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined Supreme Court should not have ruled Cynthia G was mentally ill based solely on her behavior in the courtroom without holding a hearing. Although Cynthia G has been released from the involuntary confinement ordered by Supreme Court, the appeal was heard as an exception to the mootness doctrine because situation is likely to reoccur:

On June 20, 2019, Cynthia G. was involuntarily confined to the Hospital pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law § 9.27. On June 27, 2019, Cynthia G. made an application pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law § 9.31 for a hearing on the question of need for involuntary care and treatment. While the parties appeared in court for the hearing, the Supreme Court did not hold the hearing. Rather, Cynthia G. was escorted out of the courtroom based on her behavior, which included “yelling and screaming,” acting “verbally aggressive,” and making “threatening movements.” Over the objection of Cynthia G.’s counsel, the court determined that it could not proceeded with a hearing due to Cynthia G.’s behavior. The court indicated that it would deny Cynthia G.’s application for release, finding that her courtroom behavior in and of itself constituted clear and convincing evidence that she suffered from a mental illness which was likely to result in serious harm to herself or others.

By order dated July 2, 2019, the Supreme Court denied Cynthia G.’s application pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law § 9.31 to compel the Hospital to release her from involuntary confinement. …

… [T]he Supreme Court erred in failing to hold a hearing pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law § 9.31(c), and in determining, in effect, that Cynthia G. was mentally ill, in need of further care or treatment, and posed a substantial threat of physical harm to herself or others, without taking any testimony or evidence by either Cynthia G. or the Hospital … . Matter of G., 2020 NY Slip Op 06525, Second Dept 11-12-20

 

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