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AFTER DEFENSE COUNSEL REPEATEDLY USED THE N-WORD (QUOTING A CO-DEFENDANT) IN CROSS-EXAMINING THE VICTIM A JUROR STOOD UP AND SAID SHE FOUND THE WORD VERY OFFENSIVE AND WOULD LEAVE IF COUNSEL USED THE WORD AGAIN; THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT CONDUCT A BUFORD HEARING TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE JUROR SHOULD BE DISQUALIFIED; CONVICTION AFFIRMED OVER A THREE-JUDGE DISSENT (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge DeFiore, over a three-judge dissent, determined there was no need for the trial court to conduct a Buford  hearing to determine whether a juror should be disqualified. Defense counsel, quoting the words used by a co-defendant, repeatedly said the “n-word.” A juror stood up and said she would leave if counsel use the word again because she found very offensive. The trial court denied a motion for a mistrial and gave a curative instruction. On appeal the defendant argued the trial court should have conducted a Buford hearing and determined that the juror was grossly unqualified:

This appeal by defendant presents the issue … whether the trial court abused its discretion as a matter of law in giving the jury a curative instruction and forgoing a Buford inquiry (People v Buford, 69 NY2d 290 [1987]) of a sworn juror after her mid-trial exclamation that she was “very offen[ded]” by the repetitive use of a racial slur by Bailey’s counsel while cross-examining the victim. Viewed in context, the record supports the trial court’s findings that the juror’s reaction was triggered by counsel’s fifth and gratuitous use of the epithet, and provided no basis to indicate she was grossly unqualified. Since the entire incident unfolded in open court, a Buford inquiry of the juror was unnecessary, as the court was able to adequately assess that her outburst was not a transformative one and her sworn oath to be impartial remained intact. The court’s remedy of admonishing the juror and counsel and issuing a carefully crafted curative instruction—which included a mechanism for any juror to advise the court if they could not be fair and impartial due to anything that occurred at trial—was not an abuse of its discretion. * * *

… [N]ot every allegation of juror misconduct warrants an intrusive Buford inquiry, and we have approved alternate procedures and ameliorative instructions when juror bias or partiality is not in doubt … . In determining whether there are new facts to impugn the jury’s original oath of impartiality or a need to investigate alleged juror misconduct, “‘the court must consider the content of the allegations, the seriousness of the alleged misconduct or bias, and the credibility of the source'” … . Thus, while a court “must investigate and, if necessary, correct a problem, it must also avoid tainting a jury unnecessarily. . . . In this endeavor, sometimes less is more” … . People v Batticks, 2020 NY Slip Op 05840, Ct App 10-20-20

 

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