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THE VILLAGE DID NOT DEMONSTRATE INFANT PLAINTIFF ASSUMED THE RISK OF INJURY FROM A TIRE SWING IN THE VILLAGE PLAYGROUND; THE VILLAGE’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the village did not demonstrate infant plaintiff assumed the risk of injury from a tire swing in a village playground. Apparently the swing struck a railing causing infant plaintiff’s leg to slip out from under him and his leg struck a support post:

… [T]he Village failed to demonstrate its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law based on the doctrine of primary assumption of risk. Although the locations of the railing and support post were open and obvious, the submissions of the Village failed to establish, prima facie, that the structure was not negligently designed so as to permit the tire to come into contact with the railing and support post, thereby unreasonably increasing the risks over and above the usual dangers that are inherent in playing on a tire swing … . In addition, in light of the infant plaintiff’s age and limited experience with this tire swing, it cannot presently be determined as a matter of law that he was aware of and fully appreciated the risks involved with the tire being able to come into contact with the railing and support post … .

Further, the Village failed to establish, prima facie, that it neither created the allegedly dangerous condition nor had actual or constructive notice of the condition … , or that the infant plaintiff’s accident was not foreseeable … . Berrin v Incorporated Vil. of Babylon, 2020 NY Slip Op 05177, Second Dept 9-30-20

 

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