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CANCELLATION AND DISCHARGE OF A MORTGAGE PURSUANT TO RPAPL 1501 (4) MUST BE SOUGHT BY AN ACTION OR COUNTERCLAIM, NOT BY A MOTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the motion to cancel and discharge the mortgage pursuant to RPAPL 1501 (4) should not have been granted. That relief must be sought by an action or counterclaim:

Supreme Court should not have granted that branch of the motion which was to cancel and discharge the mortgage pursuant to RPAPL 1501(4), since that relief must be sought in an action or counterclaim and not by motion … . Bank of N.Y. Mellon v 11 Bayberry St., LLC, 2020 NY Slip Op 05175,  Second Dept 9-30-20

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A MOTION TO DISMISS AN ACTION FOR A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT FOR FAILURE TO STATE... THE VILLAGE DID NOT DEMONSTRATE INFANT PLAINTIFF ASSUMED THE RISK OF INJURY...