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INSTEAD OF DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR FAILURE TO INCLUDE A NECESSARY PARTY, SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE ORDERED THE PARTY SUMMONED PURSUANT TO CPLR 1001 (b) (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the petition seeking review of the village planning board’s decision re: petitioner’s application for approval of a subdivision should not have been dismissed. Because the planning board’s decision affected another landowner (160 South Ocean, LLC) Supreme Court dismissed the petition for failure to include a necessary party. The Second Department held Supreme Court should have ordered the party summoned pursuant to CPLR 1001 (b):

160 South Ocean, LLC, is a necessary party to this proceeding (see CPLR 1001[a]) subject to the jurisdiction of the court, and therefore, the Supreme Court should have “order[ed] [it] summoned,” rather than denying the petition and dismissing the proceeding for failure to join a necessary … party (CPLR 1001[b] …). Accordingly, we reinstate the petition and remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, for further proceedings, including a determination on the merits of the respondents’ motion, inter alia, to dismiss the petition … . Matter of Mulford Bay, LLC v Rocco, 2020 NY Slip Op 05050, Second Dept 9-23-30

 

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