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AS A MATTER OF PUBLIC POLICY AN INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CAUSE OF ACTION CANNOT BE BROUGHT AGAINST A GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant city’s motion for summary judgment in this false arrest and imprisonment, malicious prosecution, civil rights violation, negligent hiring and retention and intentional infliction of emotional distress action should have been granted, in large part because there was probable cause for defendant’s arrest. The court noted that an intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action cannot be brought against a municipality:

… [T]he defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the cause of action to recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, since “[i]t is well settled that public policy bars claims sounding in intentional infliction of emotional distress against a governmental entity” … . Rapuzzi v City of New York, 2020 NY Slip Op 05067, Second Dept 9-23-30

 

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ARGUMENT RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN REPLY PAPERS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED, HOSPITAL DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT WAS NOT VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR A PHYSICIAN BECAUSE THE WRITTEN AGREEMENTS CONCERNING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE HOSPITAL AND THE PHYSICIAN WERE NOT SUBMITTED (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF ASSUMED THE RISK OF PARTICIPATING IN AN OBSTACLE COURSE RACE; PLAINTIFF FELL ATTEMPTING A ‘MONSTER CLIMB’ WHICH HAD BEEN ERECTED ON A ROADWAY WITH NO MATS BENEATH (SECOND DEPT).
SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE GRANTED DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE INDICTMENT IN THE FURTHERANCE OF JUSTICE WITHOUT HOLDING A HEARING BECAUSE ESSENTIAL FACTS WERE IN DISPUTE (SECOND DEPT).
THE COMPLAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED BECAUSE PLAINTIFF HAD NOT YET BEEN APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR OF PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT’S ESTATE; PLAINTIFF IS FREE TO COMMENCE A NEW ACTION WITHIN SIX MONTHS PURSUANT TO CPLR 205 (A) UPON ISSUANCE OF LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION (SECOND DEPT).
NEITHER PLAINTIFF NOR DEFENDANTS WERE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS “FALL FROM AN A-FRAME LADDER” CASE (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFFS’ ACTION ALLEGING BREACH OF AN ORAL CONTRACT REGARDING REPAYMENT OF A LOAN SECURED BY A NOTE AND MORTGAGE SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS; THE FRAUD AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT CAUSES OF ACTION MUST BE DISMISSED AS DUPLICATIVE OF THE BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSE OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

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BECAUSE THE TRIAL JUDGE OMITTED A PORTION OF THE BURGLARY JURY INSTRUCTIONS... PLAINTIFF BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS...