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THE 1896 DEED FROM THE PLAINTIFF WHICH TRANSFERRED THE PROPERTY TO DEFENDANT DIOCESE WITH THE LIMITATION THAT IT BE USED AS A CHURCH CREATED A POSSIBILITY OF REVERTER WHICH TRANSFERRED THE PROPERTY BACK TO THE PLAINTIFF WHEN THE PROPERTY STOPPED BEING USED AS A CHURCH IN 2015 (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the 1896 deed to defendant Catholic diocese, which limited the use of the property to serving as a church, conveyed a fee on limitation with a possibility of reverter, which transferred the property to back to plaintiff when the diocese stopped using the property as a church in 2015:

As plaintiff still held a possibility of reverter, resolution of the RPAPL article 15 action hinges upon whether defendant violated the limitation restricting the use of the property to church purposes. The parties’ joint stipulation of facts includes the 2015 decree from the Bishop of Ogdensburg that relegated the church “to profane but not sordid use,” and indicated that parishioners would be served by a nearby parish. … The stained-glass windows and the altar were later removed, leaving only the pews. Under the canon law of the Roman Catholic Church, “if a church cannot be used in any way for divine worship and there is no possibility of repairing it,” it can be relegated to profane but not sordid use … . “Profane use means use for purposes other than a Roman Catholic worship service,” and “sordid” limits that use, prohibiting any use that is disrespectful to the Catholic Church … . Contrary to defendant’s contentions, we find that defendant’s use of the property for church purposes ceased pursuant to the 2015 decree, thus violating the limitation in the 1896 deed. Accordingly, it reverted to plaintiff, which now owns the property in fee simple. Paul Smith’s Coll. of Arts & Sciences v Roman Catholic Diocese of Ogdensburg, 2020 NY Slip Op 05012, Third Dept 9-17-20

 

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