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RULING THAT DEFENDANT COULD BE CROSS-EXAMINED ABOUT THREE PRIOR GUN-RELATED CONVICTIONS IF HE TESTIFIED THE SHOOTING WAS AN ACCIDENT DID NOT DEPRIVE DEFENDANT OF THE RIGHT TO PUT ON A DEFENSE; TWO DISSENTERS DISAGREED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, affirming defendant’s murder conviction, over a two-justice dissent, determined Molineux the ruling that defendant could be cross-examined about his three prior gun-related convictions if he were to testify the shooting was an accident did not deprive defendant of the right to put on a defense. The dissenter argued that it did:

Prior to trial, the Supreme Court ruled that if the defendant were to testify that the shooting was an accident, the People would be permitted to offer evidence, through their cross-examination of him, of the facts underlying his three prior gun-related convictions … . The defendant contends that this ruling deprived him of his due process right to a fair trial as it deterred him from testifying at trial. Contrary to the defendant’s contention, and the position of our dissenting colleagues, the court’s Molineux ruling did not deprive the defendant of his right to a fair trial … . Moreover, any error in the ruling was harmless, as there was overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt and no reasonable possibility that any error might have contributed to the defendant’s conviction … . * * *

From the dissent:

… [T]he fact that the defendant committed gun-related offenses against persons other than the victim nearly 20 years before the subject shooting bears no relevance whatsoever to the issue of whether the subject shooting was an accident. In my view, permitting the People to elicit the underlying facts of prior gun-related acts that were totally unrelated to the victim would serve only to demonstrate that the defendant had a propensity for gun violence … . Consequently, the Supreme Court’s pretrial ruling in this case cannot be justified under Molineux and, thus, the ruling effectively precluded the defendant from presenting a defense. People v Huertas, 2020 NY Slip Op 04577, Second Dept 8-19-20

 

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