You are here: / / NOTIFICATION OF AN INTENTION TO CANCEL AN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE POLICY IF...

NOTIFICATION OF AN INTENTION TO CANCEL AN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE POLICY IF A QUESTIONNAIRE IS NOT SUBMITTED IS NOT A VALID CANCELLATION, THE POLICY REMAINED IN EFFECT DESPITE THE INSURED’S FAILURE TO SUBMIT THE QUESTIONNAIRE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the insurer’s (GEICO’s) purported cancellation of the automobile insurance policy was invalid for two reasons: (1) the notice of cancellation was insufficient; and (2) the reason for the cancellation was not among those allowed by the Insurance Law. GEICO notified the insured (Islam) the policy would be cancelled unless Islam submitted a completed questionnaire by a certain date. Islam did not submit the questionnaire:

“[A] mere expression of a purpose or intention to cancel in the future is not sufficient; that is, it must be one of actual cancellation, not of future conditional cancellation, or of doubtful meaning as to time or purpose” … . The purported cancellation notice reflected a mere intention to cancel in the future if Islam did not provide a completed business use questionnaire.

In any event, cancellation is permitted only upon specified grounds once a covered policy has been in effect for at least 60 days (see Insurance Law § 3425[c][1][A-C]). Insurance Law § 3425(c)(1)(C) requires the “discovery of fraud or material misrepresentation in obtaining the policy or in the presentation of a claim thereunder” to cancel an automobile insurance policy during the required policy period of one year (Insurance Law § 3425[c][1][C]). Here, there is no dispute that the GEICO policy had been in effect for at least 60 days at the time of the purported cancellation. GEICO did not establish that it had discovered any fraud or material misrepresentation committed by Islam; thus, GEICO did not sustain its burden of demonstrating that its notice of cancellation complied with the statutory requirements of Insurance Law § 3425(c)(1) … . Matter of Unitrin Direct Ins. Co. v Barrow, 2020 NY Slip Op 04481, Second Dept 8-12-20

 

You might also like
PLAINTIFF BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE STANDING TO BRING THE FORECLOSURE ACTION; THE REQUIRED BUSINESS RECORDS WERE NOT SUBMITTED (SECOND DEPT).
EVEN WHERE DEFENDANT PLED GUILTY AND WAIVED APPEAL WITH THE UNDERSTANDING HE WILL NOT BE AFFORDED YOUTHFUL OFFENDER STATUS A MOTION TO VACATE THE SENTENCE BASED ON THE JUDGE’S FAILURE TO CONSIDER YOUTHFUL OFFENDER STATUS IS AVAILABLE (SECOND DEPT).
Plaintiff Had Made Out a Prima Facie Case of Undue Influence—Trial Judge Erred by Making Credibility Determinations and Granting a Judgment In Favor of the Defendant As a Matter of Law (CPLR 4401)
THE TRUSTEES DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE AVAILABILITY OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS OR LACHES DEFENSES TO THE ACTION SEEKING AN ESTATE ACCOUNTING; THE TRUSTEES DID NOT OPENLY REPUDIATE THEIR FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS AND, THEREFORE, THE TIME DID NOT BEGIN TO RUN FOR EITHER DEFENSE (SECOND DEPT).
Family Offense Must Be Established by Fair Preponderance
THE POLICE DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A LAWFUL BASIS FOR IMPOUNDING DEFENDANT’S VEHICLE AND CONDUCTING AN INVENTORY SEARCH; DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE SEIZED EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
ERROR TO ALLOW PROSECUTOR TO IMPEACH HER OWN WITNESS WITH THE WITNESS’S GRAND JURY TESTIMONY, EVIDENTIARY ERRORS COUPLED WITH PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT REQUIRED REVERSAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE.
Criteria for Pre-Action Disclosure and Defamation Explained

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

RESPONDENT IS A DANGEROUS SEX OFFENDER REQUIRING CONFINEMENT, NOT STRICT AND... DEFENDANT HAS THE RIGHT TO BE PERSONALLY PRESENT AT RESENTENCING ABSENT WAIVER,...