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DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE REDUCED IN THIS MANSLAUGHTER, BURGLARY, MURDER CASE DUE TO DEFENDANT’S AGE AND MENTAL ILLNESS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department found defendant’s sentence of 25 years to life in this manslaughter, burglary, murder case unduly harsh and severe due to his age and his mental illness. Sentence reduced to 15 years to life:

This Court “has broad, plenary power to modify a sentence that is unduly harsh or severe under the circumstances, even though the sentence may be within the permissible statutory range,” and may exercise that power, “if the interest of justice warrants, without deference to the sentencing court” … . Defendant was 20 years old at the time of the offense. His criminal history consisted of only three incidents within the year leading up to the killing, all of which stemmed from the onset of defendant’s documented schizophrenia and all charges were dismissed as a result of defendant’s incapacity due to mental disease or defect. Here, at trial, both experts testified that, at the time of the killing, defendant was experiencing delusions. Indeed, the People’s own expert expressly recognized that defendant had a diminished capacity to understand the wrongfulness of his actions at the time and that “the action was a product of his symptoms of mental illness.” … [W]e modify the judgment by reducing the sentences of imprisonment imposed for manslaughter in the first degree under count one of the indictment and for burglary in the first degree under counts three and four of the indictment to determinate terms of 15 years, to be followed by the five years of postrelease supervision imposed by the court, and by reducing the sentence imposed for murder in the second degree under count two of the indictment to an indeterminate term of incarceration of 15 years to life. People v Gillie, 2020 NY Slip Op 04275, Third Dept 7-24-20

 

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DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY SENTENCED TO INCARCERATION UPON A VIOLATION OF PROBATION... THE DUPLICITY IN THE INDICTMENT WAS REMEDIED BY DETAILS PROVIDED TO THE DEFENSE...