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DEFENDANT DOCTORS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED; ONE DOCTOR DID NOT DEMONSTRATE HE DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE RESUSCITATION OF THE NEWBORN; THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER A SECOND DOCTOR EMPLOYED THE PROPER RESUSCITATION METHOD (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the summary judgment motions brought by two defendant doctors in this medical malpractice action should not have been granted. Essentially the alleged malpractice concerned the resuscitation of plaintiffs’ baby, E.K., in the seconds and minutes after birth. There were questions of fact about whether Dr. De Christofaro participated in the resuscitation efforts. And there were questions of fact whether Dr. Aleti-Jacobs used a proper resuscitation method:

De Christofaro failed to demonstrate his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him. The expert affirmations submitted in support of De Christofaro’s motion failed to address, inter alia, the plaintiffs’ allegation i… that De Christofaro departed from the standard of care with regard to the resuscitation and intubation that took place in the minutes following E. K.’s birth. In particular, De Christofaro failed to eliminate triable issues of fact regarding his level of participation in the resuscitation and intubation of E. K. … . While De Christofaro testified at his deposition that there was nothing in E. K.’s medical records indicating that he was present in the delivery room during the intubation of E. K., the record does not conclusively establish his absence … . Critically, De Christofaro testified that he could not place an exact time at which he first became involved in E. K.’s care, that he “most certainly could have been there and helped in the resuscitation,” and that he could not recall the circumstances regarding E. K.’s intubation or who performed the intubation. …

… [T]he plaintiffs raised a triable issue of fact through the affirmation of their expert, who opined, inter alia, that Aleti-Jacobs breached the standard of care by administering PPV [positive pressure ventilation] to E. K. upon his birth rather than immediately intubating him. The plaintiffs’ expert opined that a baby, such as E. K., who was born with an Apgar score of one should have been intubated “within the first 15 to 20 second[s] of life.” According to one hospital record, E. K. was not successfully intubated until four minutes after his birth. Additionally, the plaintiffs’ expert’s opinion was sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the alleged failure to timely intubate E. K. was a proximate cause of his injuries. E.K. v Tovar, 2020 NY Slip Op 03904, Second Dept 7-15-20

 

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