You are here: / / DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE FOREIGN CORPORATION WAS DOING BUSINESS...
, ,

DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE FOREIGN CORPORATION WAS DOING BUSINESS IN NEW YORK WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION; DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION ON THAT GROUND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined a defendant in this foreclosure action brought by a foreign corporation did not demonstrate the corporation was doing business in New York without authorization. Therefore defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint on that ground should not have been granted:

“Business Corporation Law § 1312(a) constitutes a bar to the maintenance of an action by a foreign corporation found to be doing business in New York without . . . the required authorization to do business there” … . “The purpose of that section is to regulate foreign corporations which are doing business’ within the State, not . . . to enable the avoidance of contractual obligations” … . “[T]he party relying upon this statutory barrier bears the burden of proving that the corporation’s business activities in New York were not just casual or occasional, but so systematic and regular as to manifest continuity of activity in the jurisdiction”… . “[A]bsent proof establishing that the [subject corporation] is doing business in New York, it is presumed that [it] is doing business in [the] State of incorporation, and not in New York” … .

The defendant failed to establish, prima facie, that “[the appellant] conducted continuous activities in [New York] essential to its corporate business” … . Therefore, “the presumption that [the appellant] does business, not in New York but in its State of incorporation has not been overcome” … . JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Didato, 2020 NY Slip Op 03903, Second Dept 7-15-20

 

You might also like
Revocation of Driver’s License for Refusal of the Chemical Test Reversed—No “Reasonable Suspicion” to Justify Vehicle Stop
THE FEDERAL CONSPIRACY-TO-DEAL-IN-FIREARMS STATUTE HAS DIFFERENT ELEMENTS THAN ITS NEW YORK EQUIVALENT AND THEREFORE CAN NOT BE THE BASIS OF A SECOND FELONY OFFENDER ADJUDICATION (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF’S DEMAND FOR MONETARY DAMAGES AND EQUITABLE RELIEF IN THIS EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASE DID NOT WAIVE THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL; PLAINTIFF COULD BE MADE WHOLE ENTIRELY BY A MONETARY AWARD (SECOND DEPT). ​
EVIDENCE DEFENDANT HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN CONVICTED OF STEALING A CAR SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED TO SHOW KNOWLEDGE AND INTENT IN THIS CAR THEFT CASE, KNOWLEDGE AND INTENT CAN BE INFERRED FROM THE ACT, ERROR HARMLESS HOWEVER (SECOND DEPT).
QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE CORPORATE VEIL SHOULD BE PIERCED IN THIS BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION (SECOND DEPT).
FAMILY COURT SHOULD HAVE MADE FINDINGS TO ALLOW THE CHILD TO PETITION FOR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS (SECOND DEPT).
“NOTWITHSTANDING” CLAUSE IN THE ADDENDUM TO THE NOTE CONTROLS, THE ADDENDUM REQUIRED THAT THE MONTHLY PAYMENTS ON THE NOTE START BEFORE THE DATE DESCRIBED IN THE NOTE ITSELF (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE STANDING TO FORECLOSE ON THE REVERSE MORTGAGE WITH EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE UNDER THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE CONFIRMED THE REFEREE’S REPORT ABSENT A... DEFENDANT DOCTORS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE...