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QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE POLICE OFFICER, ANSWERING A CALL, ACTED RECKLESSLY IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined there was a question of fact whether the defendant police officer (McMahon) acted recklessly in this traffic accident case. The officer, responding to a call, passed a line of cars by straddling the yellow line without siren or lights and struck plaintiff as plaintiff was attempting to make a left turn:

“[T]he reckless disregard standard of care in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e) only applies when a driver of an authorized emergency vehicle involved in an emergency operation engages in the specific conduct exempted from the rules of the road by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(b). Any other injury-causing conduct of such a driver is governed by the principles of ordinary negligence”… . Conduct exempted from the rules of the road by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(b) includes disregarding regulations governing the direction of movement or turning in specified directions … .

Here, the defendants established that the reckless disregard standard of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 was applicable to McMahon’s conduct because he was responding to a radio call of a motor vehicle accident with unknown injuries … . However, the defendants failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law because their moving papers presented a triable issue of fact regarding whether McMahon was reckless in straddling the double-yellow line to pass a row of vehicles without using his warning siren or lights when he collided with the plaintiff’s vehicle … . Rodriguez-Garcia v Southampton Police Dept., 2020 NY Slip Op 03813, Second Dept 7-8-20

 

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