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DEFENDANT’S INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY REQUIRED A MORE PROBING COLLOQUY BEFORE ACCEPTING THE GUILTY PLEA AND THE WAIVER OF APPEAL, PLEA VACATED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, vacating defendant’s guilty plea to murder, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Manzanet-Daniels, determined defendant’s intellectual disability required a more probing colloquy to ensure defendant understood the ramifications of the plea and the waiver of appeal:

Defendant’s psychological assessments cast serious doubt about his ability to enter a knowing and voluntary plea. DOE records showed defendant to have been diagnosed as mentally retarded and to suffer from “severe academic delays.” The records indicated that with an IQ of only 56, defendant had “extremely low” “general cognitive ability,” with “overall thinking and reasoning abilities” in the bottom 0.2%. Those records further indicated that defendant’s verbal comprehension, perceptual reasoning, working memory, and processing speed were “extremely low,” in the bottom 0.2 to 2%.

The CPL 390 report, ordered by the trial court in aid of sentencing, confirmed the doubts regarding defendant’s mental capacity and ability to understand or participate in the proceedings. Doctors at Bellevue observed defendant to suffer from an intellectual disability with “extremely low” intellectual functioning. Defendant’s IQ placed him in the bottom one percentile as compared to his peers. The report noted that defendant’s limited cognitive abilities placed him at increased risk of impulsive behavior without regard to the consequences of his actions. People v Patillo, 2020 NY Slip Op 03754, Second Dept 7-2-20

 

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