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PLAINTIFF SOUGHT ONLY CANCELLATION OF A MORTGAGE; THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, CANCELLED THE NOTE AS WELL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the judge should not have, sua sponte, granted relief that was not asked for by the plaintiff. Plaintiff sought cancellation and discharge of a mortgage pursuant to Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) 1501(4). The judge cancelled the mortgage and the note:

“The court may grant relief that is warranted pursuant to a general prayer for relief contained in a notice of motion if the relief granted is not too dramatically unlike the relief sought, the proof offered supports it, and there is no prejudice to any party” … . Here, the plaintiff only sought cancellation and discharge of the subject mortgage, not cancellation of the note. The Supreme Court should not have granted additional relief sua sponte … . We note that the plaintiff lacked standing to seek cancellation of the note, as it was not a party to it. Trenton Capital, LLC v Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 2020 NY Slip Op 03416, Second Dept 6-17-20

 

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