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UNDER THE TERMS OF THE MORTGAGE, THE DEATH OF THE BORROWER DID NOT ACCELERATE THE DEBT; BECAUSE THE DEBT WAS NOT ACCELERATED THE INSTALLMENT PAYMENTS FOR THE SIX YEARS PRIOR TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE FORECLOSURE ACTION WERE STILL OWING AND THE ACTION WAS NOT BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the foreclosure action should not have been dismissed as time-barred, noting that the death of the borrower did not accelerate the debt. Therefore the installment payments due during the six year prior to commencing the action were still owing:

An action to foreclose a mortgage is subject to a six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [4]). Here, the note provided that decedent agreed to repay the loan in monthly installments from September 2007 to August 2032. “[W]ith respect to a mortgage payable in installments, there are separate causes of action for each installment accrued, and the [s]tatute of [l]imitations [begins] to run, on the date each installment [becomes] due” … . Plaintiff commenced this foreclosure action on September 15, 2017. Therefore, recovery for the installments due within the six years prior to that date, i.e., September 15, 2011, is not barred by the statute of limitations. To the extent that plaintiff seeks recovery for installments due before that date, recovery is barred by the statute of limitations … . * * *

We reject defendants’ contention that the debt accelerated automatically upon decedent’s death. The mortgage provides that there is a default upon decedent’s death, but it does not provide that the death of decedent would automatically accelerate the debt. Rather, the mortgage provides that the lender may accelerate the debt upon a default and, here, defendants did not establish that plaintiff chose to accelerate the debt at any time before the complaint was filed … . Wilmington Sav. Fund Socy. FSB v Deliberto, 2020 NY Slip Op 03297, Fourth Dept 6-12-20

 

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