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COCAINE IS NOT DANGEROUS CONTRABAND WITHIN THE MEANING OF PROMOTING PRISON CONTRABAND IN THE FIRST DEGREE; CONVICTION REDUCED TO PROMOTING PRISON CONTRABAND IN THE SECOND DEGREE (PROHIBITING ‘CONTRABAND,’ AS OPPOSED TO ‘DANGEROUS CONTRABAND’) (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) County Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Troutman, over a two-justice concurrence and a dissent, determined cocaine does not meet the statutory definition of dangerous contraband within the meaning of the offense of promoting prison contraband in the first degree. The defendant’s conviction, based upon the possession of three baggies of cocaine, was reduced to promoting prison contraband in the second degree:

“A person is guilty of promoting prison contraband in the first degree when . . . [that person] knowingly and unlawfully introduces any dangerous contraband into a detention facility” (Penal Law § 205.25 [1]). “Dangerous contraband” is defined as any contraband that is “capable of such use as may endanger the safety or security of a detention facility or any person therein” (§ 205.00 [4]). “[T]he test for determining whether an item is dangerous contraband is whether its particular characteristics are such that there is a substantial probability that the item will be used in a manner that is likely to cause death or other serious injury, to facilitate an escape, or to bring about other major threats to a detention facility’s institutional safety or security” … . ” [W]eapons, tools, explosives and similar articles likely to facilitate escape or cause disorder, damage or physical injury are examples of dangerous contraband,’ ” whereas an ” alcoholic beverage is an example of [ordinary] contraband’ ” … . Drugs, unlike weapons, are not inherently dangerous, and thus general penological concerns about the drug possessed that “are not addressed to the specific use and effects of the particular drug are insufficient to meet the definition of dangerous contraband” … . * * *

Central to our dissenting colleague’s analysis is a distinction between narcotic and non-narcotic controlled substances. The unstated premise is that cocaine is classified as a narcotic because it is inherently dangerous. We respectfully disagree with that premise. Cocaine may be unhealthy, but it is not a narcotic, at least not from a scientific, medical, or pharmacological viewpoint … . People v Simmons, 2020 NY Slip Op 03350, Fourth Dept 6-12-20

 

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