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VENUE WAS IMPROPER; DEFENDANTS FOLLOWED THE STATUTORY PROCEDURE AND MOVED FOR A CHANGE OF VENUE; NO OTHER PARTY MOVED FOR A CHANGE OF VENUE; THE MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendants’ (Transit Authorities’) motion to change venue should have been granted. Venue was improper, the Transit Authorities followed the correct procedure, and no other party made a motion to change venue:

After plaintiffs commenced this action in Bronx County, the Transit Authorities timely served a demand for a change of venue as of right to New York County, where one of them has its principal office (see CPLR 505[a]; 511). Plaintiffs did not respond to the demand, and the Transit Authorities timely moved to change venue (see CPLR 510[1]; 511[b]). In opposition to the motion, plaintiffs did not dispute that their choice of venue was improper, but requested that venue be placed in Kings County, where the accident occurred. No other defendant timely appeared in opposition to the motion, although the City defendants submitted a belated affirmation asserting that venue should be placed in Kings County under CPLR 504(3).

By failing to respond to the Transit Authorities’ demand to change venue to a proper forum, plaintiffs forfeited their right to select venue … . Further, no party moved to transfer venue to an alternate county … . Thus, once the Transit Authorities had followed the procedure set forth in CPLR 511 and established that the county chosen by plaintiffs was improper, their motion to change venue to New York County as of right should have been granted … . Richardson v City of New York, 2020 NY Slip Op 03281, First Dept 6-11-20

 

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