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THE APPELLATE DIVISION COULD NOT DECIDE THE APPEAL OF THE DENIAL OF A SUPPRESSION MOTION ON A GROUND NOT RELIED UPON BY THE SUPPRESSION COURT (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, determined the Appellate Division could not decide the appeal of the denial of a suppression motion on a ground (exigent circumstances) that was not relied on by the suppression court:

… [D]efendant moved to suppress physical evidence found inside a suitcase that he was carrying at the time of his arrest, relying on People v Gokey (60 NY2d 309 [1983]), and arguing that exigent circumstances were needed to justify a warrantless search of the closed suitcase. Supreme Court determined that Gokey did not apply and, therefore, made no findings regarding the existence of exigent circumstances. The Appellate Division affirmed on a different ground, determining, as both defendant and the People argued, that Gokey did apply and accepting the People’s argument that exigent circumstances—namely, the protection of evidence or the safety of the police or the public—justified the search … .

“Upon an appeal to an intermediate appellate court from a judgment, sentence or order of a criminal court, such intermediate appellate court may consider and determine any question of law or issue of fact involving error or defect in the criminal court proceedings which may have adversely affected the appellant” (CPL 470.15 [1]). “This provision is a legislative restriction on the Appellate Division’s power to review issues either decided in an appellant’s favor, or not ruled upon, by the trial court'” … . The statute ” bars the Appellate Division from affirming a judgment, sentence or order on a ground not decided adversely to the appellant by the trial court'” … . This “restriction applies in equal force to this Court which itself has no broader review powers'” … .

Here, the Appellate Division did not err in determining that Gokey was applicable, the only reviewable issue before it. However, “[b]ecause the suppression court did not deny the motion on the ground that there were exigent circumstances, that issue was not decided adversely to defendant and it could not be invoked by the Appellate Division” … . Accordingly, the Appellate Division erred in deciding that issue. People v Harris, 2020 NY Slip Op 03208, CtApp 6-9-20

 

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