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ALTHOUGH THE INDICTMENT CHARGED THE DEFENDANT WITH THE INTENTIONAL KILLING OF SCOTT WRIGHT, THE JURY WAS TOLD IN ANSWER TO ITS QUESTION THAT IT COULD CONVICT THE DEFENDANT IF THEY FOUND DEFENDANT INTENDED TO KILL THE NEXT PERSON WHO CAME THROUGH THE DOOR, IRRESPECTIVE OF THE IDENTITY OF THAT PERSON; THE JURY INSTRUCTION WAS DEEMED PROPER (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, affirming defendant’s murder conviction, determined the People were not required to prove defendant intended to kill the victim named in the indictment (Wright ). Although the indictment charged defendant with the intentional murder of Wright, the jury wanted to know if they could convict if they concluded defendant simply intended to kill the next person who came through the door (who happened to be Wright). The judge answered the jury’s question in the affirmative and the Third Department held the jury was properly instructed:

As defendant argues, “a jury charge may not constructively amend an indictment by varying the theory of the prosecution” … . “However, not every fact mentioned in an indictment is essential to establish the defendant’s guilt of the crime charged, and thus it is not necessary in every case that the People prove all acts alleged in the indictment when the remaining acts alleged are sufficient to sustain a conviction” … . Significantly, the identity of the victim is not one of the elements of the crime of murder in the second degree … . Here, the People chose to go beyond the elements that they were required to prove to obtain a conviction both by asserting in the indictment that defendant specifically intended to shoot Wright and by making that argument at trial. Nonetheless, the jury was not required to accept this part of the People’s theory to convict defendant of murder in the second degree, so long as it found that the People had proven the elements of that crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we find that the instruction did not alter the prosecution’s theory … . …

… [W]e reject defendant’s contention that County Court’s supplemental instruction prejudiced defendant by introducing the new legal principle of mistake of fact. As defendant argues, the People made no arguments based on that principle during the trial. However, defendant’s theory of defense throughout the trial was that the gun went off accidentally and that defendant did not intend to shoot Wright or anyone else. This defense of accident would not have been altered or affected if the question whether defendant mistook Wright for someone else had been raised earlier; as previously noted, the identity of the victim is not an element of the crime of murder in the second degree. People v Lee, 2020 NY Slip Op 03049, Third Dept 5-28-20

 

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